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Abstract--A procedure is demonstrated for constructing mathematical models of social systems and then 
• simulating the behavior f such systems on a computer. First, sociological concepts are transformed into 
well-defined variables, and then system dynamics techniques are employed toconstruct a set of differential 
and algebraic equations that describe the dynamics ofthose variables. These dynamics are then simulated 
and used to establish t e empirical dequacy ofthe theory being modeled. An example is provided for 
the specific social theory dealing with norm systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
The availability of small, powerful microcomputers along with simulation software expressly 
designed for such machines gives mathematical modelers the opportunity to simulate and analyze 
complex social systems. These simulations can provide a basis for comparing conflicting theories 
of social behavior and also a laboratory environment for subjecting such theories to systematic 
empirical testing. None of this existed or was possible until very recently. 
Computer simulation is a two-phase process: a mathematical model is first constructed, and 
then the model is coded and run on a computer for output and analysis. Both stages of the 
simulation process, modeling and analyzing, provide insight into the social dynamics under 
study. James S. Coleman, dean of mathematical sociologists, pointed out the advantages of the 
first phase: "One of the values of mathematics a  a language for science is its tendency to bring 
together research and theory. It forces the theorist o examine just what he does mean, and to set 
it down in unambiguous form [1]." The utility of the second phase was noted by Donald Knuth: 
"We often fail to realize how little we know about a thing until we attempt o simulate it on a 
computer [2]". 
The modeling process is much easier to accomplish in the natural sciences than in the social 
sciences because the "hard sciences" have well-established physical aws that can be expressed in 
mathematical equations. These equations are the model. The situation is different in the social 
sciences because the theories are neither so generally accepted nor as precisely expressed as in the 
natural sciences. Coleman expressed the matter succinctly when he noted that: " . . .  in sociology 
a set of concepts has never been developed which has some [such] correspondence to a simple yet 
powerful mathematical language, and at the same time, to actual social behavior." [3] 
The first successful simulations of social and managerial systems were the highly publicized works 
of Forrester [4--6] between 1961 and 1971. His modeling strategy, known as system dynamics, 
provided a framework for developing mathematical equations to express the dynamic behavior of 
such systems. Initially, the computing power and software required to run such models limited their 
use, but today anyone with an IBM-compatible PC or a later version Apple can run very complex 
systems. The necessary software is commercially available at a modest price. The Achilles' heel of 
this approach (and the basis for much of the criticism of system dynamics) is the conversion of 
verbal concepts into mathematically well-defined variables. Such transformations are difficult but 
not impossible. 
In this paper we shall show how to develop a mathematical model for a social theory dealing 
with the dynamics of change in a norm system. A segment of the theory is briefly described and 
its concepts are converted into well-defined variables. The system dynamics approach is then used 
to explore the causal relationships between these variables, which then must be quantified into 
mathematical equations. The technique should be readily transferable to other social theories. 
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We coded our model in DYNAMO, because the transposition i to computer code is straight- 
forward and the language does not assume more mathematical expertise than that possessed by 
most sociologists. Furthermore, DYNAMO code is available for IBM-compatibles and Apple 
computers. However, any good continuous simulation language could be used. 
FROM CONCEPTS TO VARIABLES 
Many concepts in the social sciences are seductively simple because we use them in everyday 
discourse. For example, who has not heard of "status", "power" or "deviance", and who does not 
have intuitive notions about what these concepts mean? Meanings, however, eside not in the words 
themselves, but rather in the people who use them, and therefore they tend to vary from one person 
to another. Thus, we must first formulate an acceptable nominal definition for each concept. 
A nominal definition should be specific enough to permit only one unequivocal interpretation 
of the concept no matter by whom it is used, but also transferable, soit can be applied to all relevant 
situations. To mathematicians, this is nothing more than having a term be "well-defined". For 
sociological concepts the idea of a well-defined variable involves two distinct processes. First, one 
must formulate an unambiguous and generally applicable nominal definition, and then one must 
specify the empirical indicator by which it may be measured. 
To illustrate, let us take a section from the model we have developed of a theory about the 
dynamics of change of informal social norms in industrialized modern societies. The theory states 
among other matters that if the legitimacy of violating such a norm increases, then informal social 
control decreases, and, as a result, the number of complicrs with the social norm will also decrease. 
This in turn will cause a further increase in the legitimacy of the violation, and thus the process 
continues until behavior that had previously been considered a norm violation becomes institution° 
alized as a new norm (see Fig. 1). 
This partial theory involves four concepts: informal social norms, norm compliers, informal 
social control and legitimacy of violations. Each of these had first to be nominally defined and then 
transformed into a variable with a numerical range. 
For the concept of social norm, we take Morris's [7] standard nominal definition: "social norms 
are generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against others' behaviors, 
beliefs, or feelings (i.e. what others ought o do, believe, feel--or else)." We then define an informal 
social norm as a social norm which has not been put in writing or otherwise formally proclaimed. 
A norm complier is someone who behaves according to the norm in question. Informal social 
control is generally taken to mean the spontaneous pressures that others exert on people to conform 
with the norm. We define informal social control as those individuals who are deterred by family, 
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neighbors, friends or others with influence from violating the norm. By specifying the observable 
results of the social pressures, namely deterrence, our definition brings us one step closer to numeri- 
cal quantifications. There is no contradiction between the two definitions; ours is just more specific. 
Legitimacy of violations i  a trickier concept, and it will serve to illustrate some of the theoretical 
analysis that can be and frequently is involved in arriving at nominal definitions. The concept of 
legitimacy implies agreement among people that its object is justified and reasonable. Thus, the 
legitimacy of a norm violation implies general agreement that it is justified and reasonable toviolate 
the norm, or conversely, that the norm in question is unreasonable or unjustified. The more 
widespread that agreement, the more legitimate the norm violation. Therefore (to facilitate the 
necessary subsequent quantification), we define legitimacy of violation as those who consider the 
norm unreasonable. 
Once the concepts have been given more precise nominal definitions, they must be transformed 
into variables with measurable units which are realistic, reliable and have face validity [8]. To be 
realistic, the units of measurement must correspond to observable entities in the real world. Thus 
"level of compliance" is not a realistic variable, though it may have intuitive meaning for many 
people, while "the population percentage who comply" is. Measurement units are reliable when 
different users, or the same user at different times, will assign the same unit value under the same 
conditions. It is a necessary condition for consistent measurement. To have face validity a 
measurement unit must adequately convey the connotation of the concept that is being measured. 
Since many sociological concepts are abstract ideas about social realities, sociologists who need 
to measure them can only use indirect indicators, that is, readily measurable entities which are 
closely associated with the concepts to be measured. The essential precondition is, of course, that 
the unit does indeed measure the intended meaning of the concept. 
For the purposes of our model, we defined four variables with the following measurement units: 
Legitimacy of violations--the percentage of the population who find the norm in 
question unreasonable. 
Norm compliers--the percentage of the population who comply with the 
norm. 
A new informal norm--a norm violation which is considered reasonable by 65% 
or more of the population. 
Informal control--the percentage ofthe population who feel restricted by the 
norm but who are deterred from violating it because of 
pressures exerted by role partners. 
RATES OF CHANGE 
Once the variables have been appropriately defined, equations relating these variables to each 
other can be developed using system dynamics techniques [9]. The first step is to construct a
causal-loop diagram--a network of oriented curves that signifiy direct cause and effect relationships 
between connected variables in the directions indicated by the arrowheads. Figure 1 is a causal-loop 
diagram for the segment of the theory described in the previous ection. 
The next step in the system dynamics modeling process is to construct a rate-level diagram (Fig. 
2). Rectangles denote state-variables in the system (model) in which units accumulate. System 
dynamicists call these levels. For our model we define two levels: norm compliers and norm 
violators. The solid lines that connect he two levels denote material flows in the system---in our 
case, movement of people from the category of compliers to that of violators, and vice versa. The 
valves on the flow lines represent the actual flows between the levels and they are called rates. 
Circles denote auxiliary variables: quantities in the system that enter into the calculation of other 
quantities (usually the rates), and the dotted lines indicate information flows from one variable to 
another. Computations may be simplified and the model be refined by adding new variables at this 
stage, provided they are realistic, reliable, and have face validity. The partial rate-level diagram 
in Fig. 2 was derived from the causal-loop diagram of Fig. 1, with the acronyms defined in Table 1. 
There are two levels in Fig. 2, norm compliers (Comply) and norm violaters (Violat). TryVio 
and QuitVi are the rates of flows between the two levels, denoting the percentage of the population 
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who either become violators or quit violations over one time period. If we quantify each of these 
rates with positive values, then the differential equations governing the model are: 
d(Violat)/dt = TryVio - QuitVi (1) 
and 
d(Comply) /dt  = QuitVi - TryVio. (2) 
Observe that Violat + Comply = 100% of the populat ion, so one of  the differential equations is 
redundant. The remaining problem is to quantify the rates, ultimately in terms of the levels. 
DEFINING FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Mathematical modeling is part art and part sc!ence, and when dealing with sociological systems 
the art frequently outweighs the science because we do not know the laws that govern such systems. 
To develop appropriate functions between variables modelers often rely on the insights of 
professional sociologists and whatever scraps of quantitative knowledge that are available. The 
Table 1 
Acronym Description 
Comply 
Differ 
Expect 
ExtFor 
Impeds 
InfCon 
Legit 
Presur 
QuitVi 
TryVio 
Violat 
Percentage ofthe population who comply with the norm 
Arithmetic difference between the expected and the actual percentage ofnorm violators 
Expected percentage ofnorm violators in the population 
Exogenous forces that create strain between the norm and social reality 
Structural factors that impose limits on the application of informal control 
Percentage of those feeling rmtricted by the norm who are deterred from violation by peer pressure 
Percentage of the population who find the norm unreasonable 
Percentage of the population who feel restricted by the norm 
Rate at which people move from Violat to Comply 
Rate at which people move from Comply to Violat 
Percentage ofthe population who violate the norm 
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ultimate test of the correctness of these functions is the extent o which the model can replicate 
different sets of real data. 
The movement of people from compliers to violators and vice versa is influenced by two factors, 
pressure to violate (Presur) and deterrence, measured here by informal social control (InfCon). 
Although some people may violate a norm inadvertently, we assume their numbers are marginal 
and ignore them, since the vast majority of norm violators do so deliberately. Such individuals 
violate a norm because they perceive the norm to be in conflict with their wants. 
We define Presur as the percentage of the population who have something to gain by violating 
the norm, and they are found in both population categories. Individuals who feel pressure to violate 
and are not deterred from doing so are violators; compliers are either people who have nothing 
to gain by violating the norm or individuals who do feel pressure to violate but are deterred from 
doing so. 
For simplicity, we let Presur be a constant which must be estimated according to the social 
situation being studied. There may be cases in which Presur varies, but in the data sets we have 
studied we have not encountered such a case. Therefore, 
Presur = constant. (3) 
Informal social control (InfCon) is the percentage of Presur which is deterred from violating a 
norm because others pressure them into compliance. Thus, 100 - InfCon is the percentage ofPresur 
which is not deterred. The proportion is given by (100 - InfCon)/100. The expected percentage of
violators (Expect) is then 
Expect = Presur • (100 - InfCon)/100. (4) 
Expect is the expected percentage of violators based on the current amounts of Presur and 
InfCon. The actual percentage ofviolators is given by the level Violat. Thus, the difference between 
the expected value and the actual value is 
Differ = Expect - Violat. (5) 
Differ is the driving force behind the rates TryVio and QuitVi. If Differ is positive, we expect 
movement from Comply to Violat; if Differ is negative, we expect movement in the opposite 
direction. If the other variables do not fluctuate, Differ must eventually be zero, but since it often 
takes time to commit a violation, there may be a delay before this happens. 
If we consider the differential equation 
d(Violat)/dt = k • Differ, 
when Differ is positive and k denotes a positive constant, we can show that the average delay in 
moving from Comply to Violat equals 1/k time units. If we call this delay DelToV, then 
f( I /DelToV).  Differ, if Differ > 0, 
TryVio \ o , otherwise. (6) 
Similarly, if we denote the average delay in moving from Violat to Comply as DelToC, we have 
f - (1/DelToC) • Differ, if Differ < 0, QuitVi \ 0 , otherwise. (7) 
Informal Control (InfCon) is affected by legitimacy of violations (Legit). As violations gain 
legitimacy, informal control must weaken, so InfCon must be a monotonically decreasing function 
of Legit. The only question is the shape of the curve. Hamblin et al. [10], have demonstrated quite 
convincingly that a great many diffusion processes follow S-shaped curves, so it seems reasonable 
to use the same type of model here. The precise shape of the curve may be deduced from available 
data sets, but whatever S-shaped curve is ultimately chosen, it must remain invariant from one 
data set to the next. Since a theory should explain the behavior of all instances of the process it 
proposes to explain, any model representing the theory must remain structurally invariant 
simulating those processes. 
In modem industrialized societies there are structural factors that impose limits to the application 
of informal social control. The more important of these are anonymity, transience and cultural 
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heterogeneity. We operationalize such impediments a a constant percentage ofthe population who 
would not be deterred by their peers from violating the norm even if everyone lse considered the 
norm legitimate. Thus, 
Impeds = constant (8) 
and this constant has to be estimated according to the social situation being studied. Then 
100 - Impeds represents he percentage of Presur who are deterred by InfCon when Legit is zero. 
Thus 
InfCon =f(Legit), (9) 
wherefis a monotonically decreasing, S-shaped function beginning at (100 - Impeds) when Legit 
is zero and tending towards zero as Legit approaches 100% (see Fig. 3). 
The legitimacy of norm violations varies not only with the percentage of violators in the 
population but also with external forces (ExtFor) which are exogenous to the particular norm 
system under investigation. Technological or demographic changes occurring in the society are 
examples of such exogenous forces. To take these into account, we initialize Legit at run time zero 
as InLeg (for initial legitimacy), set 
InLeg = constant (10) 
and estimate this initial value. Then, if there are known exogenous time-dependent forces impinging 
on the legitimacy of violations, we define the base value of Legit (BasLeg) as 
Basleg = InLeg + ExtFor (11) 
and enter the data that document these forces into the model as a function of time. 
Legitimacy of violations will grow as the percentage ofviolators increases. The maximum value 
of Legit is 100%, so the maximum increase at any point in time is (100 - BasLeg). We hypothesize 
that the fractional increase in Legit due to violators (Fract) will also follow an S-shaped curve. 
That is, Fract is an S-shaped curve that begins at zero and increases to 1.0 as the percentage of
violators increases to 100. Thus 
Legit = BasLeg + (100 - Basleg) • Fract. (12) 
EMPIR ICAL  TEST ING 
Equations (1)-(12) constitute a mathematical model of dynamic hange in social norms, as 
conceptualized in the theory. To test the model by applying it to any particular social norm, it must 
be initialized with appropriate constants and delay times which are norm dependent and reflect he 
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social situation at simulated time zero. The model is then run, and the output compared for 
reproducibility with a time series of empirical data points. This procedure isrepeated with a number 
of different data sets over different ime periods, reflecting changes in different norms. For each 
data set, the model as defined by the differential and algebraic equations remains the same; only 
the initial conditions at simulated time zero are changed from one rua to the next. To the extent 
that the model can replicate the dynamic behavior of a variety of data sets, it will gain in credibility, 
and with it the underlying theory gains in empirical adequacy. 
We have presented here only a small section of our model to demonstrate the feasibility of 
modeling dynamic change in social systems. The complete model [11], consisting of some 45 
variables and constants, has so far successfully reproduced ata sets on unmarried cohabitation 
in the U.S., 1960--1983; emigration from Israel, 1949-1982; violation of factory safety regulations 
in the U.K., 1907-1937; violations of factory safety regulations in Israel, 1949-1982; the growth 
of a norm proscribing smoking in the company of others in the U.S., 1960-1985 and illegal 
immigration into the U.S., 1960-1985 (cf. Refs [11-13]. Output from three of these simulations are 
shown in Figs 4-6. In each, the data are marked with a solid curve and the computer output for 
the corresponding model output is shown with a broken curve. The close fit between the two is 
obvious and indicates that the theory is empirically adequate. 
Experimentation with the model can take many forms. We have, asked, for example, what 
would be the effect of replacing each of the hypothesized nonlinear curves such as Fig. 1 with 
straight lines. The answer is a marked deterioration i  the model's performance [14]. We have 
also routinely sought confidence limits on the range of values one might take for the initial 
conditions without adversely affecting the performance of the model, which is a sensitivity 
analysis of the model parameters. Finally, we hope to use the model to test alternative hypotheses 
for system behavior. To date, we have produced one data set which allowed for such an 
investigation [12]. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
If society is to gain confidence in social theories and use such theories in formulating public 
policy, those theories must be tested and proven, at least empirically. One approach is to develop 
mathematical models for theories, and then test the theories by testing the models. In this paper, 
we have indicated how such an approach can be implemented. The advent of microcomputers and 
the wide availability of simulation software for these machines gives allows anyone with access to 
the equipment and the requisite knowledge of sociology the ability to carry on such studies. 
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